Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications (Amiel Bernal and Guy Axtell, eds. Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window), Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window). The first two papers defend the pro-life view from recent objections involving miscarriage and abortion doctors. In this paper, I argue that if epistemic permissivism is true, then the defender of Pascal’s Wager has powerful responses to two objections. Belief, Credence, and Philosophical Views, Credal Functionalism (with Justin D’Ambrosio), Permissivism, Encroachment, and Practical Reasons for Belief, Interpersonal Faith and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs, Lifestyle WordPress Theme by themehit.com. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pascal thought that evidence cannot settle the question of whether God exists, so he proposes that you should bet, or wager, on God because of what’s at stake: you have lots to gain and not much to lose. 100. Is that a strength or a glaring weakness? Tyler McNabb: The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Under contract with Routledge. (3) What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism? Many think that Pascal’s Wager is a hopeless failure. Apologetics and the Growth of the Early Church: Eric Lyons, M.Min. My primary research lies at the intersection of traditional and formal epistemology. Apologetics, General Thinking, Religion Leave a comment. (2020). Pascal’s Wager: A Pragmatic Argument for Belief in God. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and the motivations for it. These arguments offer evidence for and against God’s existence. 8(4): 85–105. 201–215. In The Routledge Handbook of Evidence (Clayton Littlejohn and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio eds.). (2020). ... 2020-12-05 47. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. A Debate, Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction, We call attention to certain cases of epistemic akrasia, , arguing that they support belief-credence dualism. Much of the literature on the relationship between belief and credence has focused on. Religious Studies. This article explains Pascal’s wager and considers three objections. What is Pascal's Wager? In this paper, we argue against the asymmetry thesis; we show that, insofar as one accepts radical moral encroachment on belief, one should likewise accept radical moral encroachment on credences. 108. I argue that the implications of each debate depend on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. I was interviewed about this paper on Crash Course Apologetics (. (2019). We show how a version of Pascalian reasoning succeeds, and gives us a reason to pay special attention to the infinite consequences of our actions. Tyler McNabb: The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. (8) Credence: A Belief-First Approach (with Andrew Moon). If you don’t have access to the official version, all published papers are available for free download via the PhilPapers link. Following Buchak (forthcoming), I argue that peer disagreement puts us in an epistemic dilemma: there is reason to think that our opinions should both change and not change when we encounter disagreement with our epistemic peers. Under contract with Routledge. To what extent can evidence move around our credences without changing what we ought to believe? Tom Jump is considered by many to be the best debater that YouTube Atheism has to offer. How is faith different than belief? This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. In The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology (Paul Allen, ed.). credence above some threshold. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. This chapter introduces the reader to philosophical questions involving faith and reason. Learn How To Do Apologetics in the Twenty-First Century with Ravi Zacharias - Duration: ... Cosmic Skeptic vs Liz Jackson - Duration: 1:58:36. I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Ryerson University, and a Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Palm Beach Atlantic University.Previously, I was a Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy at Australian National University.. Finally, several have argued that we have more control over our attitudes in self-fulling cases; if this is right, then we may have some level of control over our faith-attitudes. In Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles (Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, and Matthias Steup, eds.). But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Notre Dame, IN: ProQuest. A primary reason for this is because a number of challenging objections have been raised to the wager, including the “many gods” objection, and the “mixed strategy” objection. (10) A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism. I also argue that if one’s credences in theism are too low to have faith, the wagerer can still. The two most famous pragmatic arguments for theism are put forth by Blaise Pascal (1662) and William James (1896). Permissivism is the view that there are evidential situations that rationally permit more than one attitude toward a proposition. I was interviewed about this paper on Believing Thinkers (, I presented this paper at the Social (Distance) Epistemology workshop (, I was interviewed about the paper on Capturing Christianity (, To be presented at the Pacific APA (March 2021, via Zoom), Presented at Valparaiso University (October 2019), Presented at the Eastern APA (January 2021, via Zoom), To be presented at New Mexico State University (Fall 2021), To be presented at the University of Leeds (Spring 2021, via Zoom), Presented at “Encroachment at Home” (May 2020, via Zoom), Presented at the Pepperdine Colloquium series (September 2020, via Zoom), To be presented at the Philosophy of Religion workshop at the Universidad Alberto Hurtado in Chile (September 2021). Within this framework, I also explore questions about the nature of evidence, e.g. Jackson does not provide a complete analysis of faith, but claims that faith is consistent with more counter-evidence than belief, and requires a desire component. What is faith? 103. In fact, if you work through them carefully you'll see that they actually give us more reason to believe in God. Under contract with Routledge. 101. May our beliefs be based partly or wholly on moral or practical considerations? Dave Miller, Ph.D. 1/1/2003: Are All Sins Equal? Latest was CC110: Catholic Apologist Matt Fradd Answers My TOP OBJECTIONS to Catholicism. I defend belief-credence dualism, the view that we have both beliefs and credences and both attitudes are equally fundamental. (2019). This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. In this paper, I examine two explanations for the evil in the world: the theistic one and the atheistic one. Along the way, I discuss a number of objections to these wagers, including the many-gods objection, the mixed strategies objection, Pascal’s mugging, the impossibility objection, the irrationality objection, and others. (1) Wagering Against Divine Hiddenness. Radical moral encroachment is the view that belief itself is morally evaluable, and that some moral properties of belief itself make a difference to epistemic rationality. Kyle Alander and Carl: TMM Responded to my 36 Questions for Atheists. For instance, if I have faith that you will make your time in your upcoming marathon, this gives you motivation and zeal, making it more likely that you will make your time. The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is normally applied to, Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. In 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. What is Pascal's Wager? I argue that all three attitudes can play the same role in rationalizing action. She argues for the rationality of faith by taking an argument against her view and showing that it fails. I argue it has broad implications for many debates in epistemology and beyond. In this chapter, I argue that this line of reasoning fails. (7) Pragmatic Arguments for Theism. They also take opposing views on the rationality of religious belief in the absence of compelling evidence. 69(276): 511–533. Liz Jackson: Examining Pascal's Wager. Finally, I respond to two objections to dualism. Instead of examining the question of which gives a better explanation of evil, I focus on a different question: which explanation of evil should we. This is an incredibly important discussion on Belief and Credence. (2) Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology. Recommended tracks CC006: My Interview with Richard Swinburne by Capturing Christianity published on 2018-04-23T15:54:01Z David Baggett Reply (pt. We focus on six popular and controversial topics: abortion, the environment, animals, poverty, punishment, and disability. Pascal’s wager, originally proposed by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), takes a more pragmatic approach. In Propositional and Doxastic Justification (Luis R.G. Pascal's Wager is a powerful tool when it is used as a framework for apologetics. I argue that we can solve this dilemma by changing our credences, but not our beliefs in response to disagreement. Of course, this doesn’t “prove” anything, but it does undermine several common attacks made against the rationality of faith. Similarly, Hitchens (2007, 137) notes that faith “choke[s] free inquiry,” and Harris (2006, 28) says that the biggest 15032-3224d-1pass-r01.indd 81 10/11/2019 12:43:39 PM 82 Liz Jackson thing standing in the way of critical thinking and intellectual honesty is faith. I begin by critically examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting ways they might be improved. An Atheist, an Agnostic, and A Theist Walk Into A Bar. This paper examines what we should say about such a state, and the next steps for a person with belief-less faith. (4) Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism. I’d be interested to hear from skeptical readers whether they think Jackson succeeds, or if they have an alternative way to argue for faith’s irrationality. Allison Low explain what apologetic is and what is different between Catholicism and other Christian communities. Then, I make two positive suggestions for how faith can be epistemically rational but nonetheless have a unique relationship to evidence: one, that Jamesian self-justifying attitudes describe a distinctive kind of faith in oneself and others, and two, that faith is not solely based on empirical evidence. All five papers make a noteworthy contribution to the moral issues that arise at the beginning of life. (3) Belief, Credence, and Faith. And what are these oughts and shoulds and mays anyway? Finally, we show how it can resist a prominent objection in the literature that has been raised to belief-first views. Broadly speaking, I am interested in the relationship between traditional and formal epistemology: ways the two subdisciplines come apart, but also their overlap and common themes. The Philosophical Quarterly. Below are abstracts of some of my unpublished current projects. The book is impartial, and set up in order to equip the reader to make up her own mind about the controversial topics covered. First, my view can explain how rational faith goes beyond the evidence. Speaker list: Dr. Luke Barnes, Dr. Liz Jackson, Dr. Braxton Hunter, Alex O'Connor (Cosmic Skeptic), Trent Horn, Dr. Sy Garte, Dr. Josh Rasmussen, and Lee Strobel. We cover three chapters per topic, and each chapter is devoted to a famous or influential argument on the topic. This topic is vital to understand as it impacts everything we do in Apologetics! by Dr. William Lane Craig; How Can Faith Go Beyond the Evidence and Still Be Rational? Routledge Studies in Epistemology. (1) The Nature and Rationality of Faith. University of Notre Dame. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. I argue that the answer is belief and middling to low credence. In The Handbook of Philosophy of Religion (Mark A. Lamport, ed.). A popular objection to theistic commitment involves the idea that faith is irrational. Under contract with Routledge. 101. In this paper, we argue that these views are misguided and defend an alternative: A question of recent interest in epistemology and philosophy of mind is how belief and credence relate to each other. A Debate (with Scott Stapleford). To date, almost all proponents of radical moral encroachment hold to an asymmetry thesis: the moral encroaches on rational belief, but not on rational credence. Are we free to believe according to our interests, feelings or desires? What are credences? Various theories have been proposed, including betting behaviour views (Ramsey 1926; de Finetti 1990), interpretivist views (Lewis 1974), and primitivist views (Eriksson and Hajek 2006). Jun 22, 2014 - Explore Liz Jackson's board "Archeology" on Pinterest. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and an affective component. 2020-12-03 42. 102. Dr. Liz Jackson Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Ryerson University; Visiting Professor, Palm Beach Atlantic University Dr. Jackson is the author of over 20 peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, in journals such as Mind , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , Philosophical Studies, and The Philosophical Quarterly . Popular-Level Writing “How Can Faith Go Beyond the Evidence and Still be Rational?”: A popular-level summary of my paper “Belief, Credence, and Faith” on a blog called “The Open Table” (June 2018). The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. Philosophia Christi. 50(5): 652–669. (13) Why Credences Are Not Beliefs. Suppose one can have faith that God exists without believing God exists. In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. (2019). (6) Belief, Credence, and Evidence. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. First, I outline various arguments that to think that faith doesn’t entail belief. Belief-credence dualism is the view that belief and credence are irreducible, equally fundamental attitudes. Consider the case of an agent who believes p, has low credence in p, and thus believes that they shouldn’t believe p to begin with. This paper examines the relationship between Pascal’s wager, faith, and hope. I argue that these considerations point to an, What attitude should philosophers take toward their favorite philosophical theories? June 3, 2018 ctgadsden. (2020). I assume it is more likely that theists go to heaven than atheists, and I argue there is a non-zero probability that one can receive infinite utility and a method of comparing outcomes with infinite utilities in which the probability of each outcome affects the final expected values. 77–92. And the same model applies to faith in oneself. Watch Queue Queue. (2019). 6/1/2016: Apologetics Is Evangelism: Jeff Miller, Ph.D. 6/1/2017: Are All Divorced Persons Eligible to Remarry? She argues for the rationality of faith by taking an argument against her view and showing that it fails. Your email address will not be published. ‎My name is Cameron Bertuzzi. This is a fact that no one denies. No,… By Andrew Rogers and Liz Jackson 1. This video is unavailable. I do so by considering a number of candidates for what faith might be. The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. I begin by discussing why. My basic proposal is that in high stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought to not. I close with reflections on the success of pragmatic theistic arguments in general, and the role they might play in rationalizing various kinds of theistic commitments. Finally, I show how religious experience can bridge the gap between faith and belief, enabling the faithful to eventually come to believe. Epistemic permissivism is the thesis that, given a body of evidence and a proposition P, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude that one can take toward P. Pascal’s Wager is the idea that one ought to believe in God for practical reasons, because of what one can gain if theism is true and what one has to lose if theism is false. Finally, I’m interested in Pascal’s Wager, and the implications it has for both decision theory and the practical rationality of theistic commitment. Notify me of follow-up comments by email. beliefs about probabilities. 197(11): 5073–5092. Cosmic Skeptic vs Liz Jackson by Capturing Christianity published on 2020-07-24T02:42:35Z. Much of my research is focused on the relationship between each subdiscipline’s doxastic building blocks, belief and credence. The person of faith and the wagerer have several things in common, including a commitment to God and positive cognitive and conative attitudes toward God’s existence. The final two papers address how rights and harms apply to children and to beings that do not yet exist. Then, I argue that, even if possible, there is something non-ideal about belief-less faith. He became a born-again Christian in January 1988, and his newfound interest in the Bible had a … This paper introduces and motivates a solution to a dilemma from peer disagreement. Forthcoming in Mind. After we present an influential argument, we then consider objections to the argument, and replies to the objections. This 2-day conference gives attendees the opportunity to see a … 2020-12-31 42. I then reply to an objection: why think that self-fulfillment sufficiently raises the probability to rationalize faith? 2020-12-03 44. Pragmatic theistic arguments, by contrast, conclude that there is a pragmatic reason to believe in God. (2) Must Beliefs and Evidence Agree? 1/28/2013: Are Children Born With Sin? This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally. I provide a model of how rational faith in oneself and in others goes beyond the evidence. Colton Scott Kyle Butt, M.Div. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. 102. I also compare Pascal’s version of the wager and James’ version of the wager. In this debate, Liz Jackson and Scott Stapleford take up these questions in an engaging style. I argue that, for each candidate, either (P1) is false or (P2) is false. Then, we offer several arguments for this view. Dr. Fred Kuttner completed his Ph.D. at UC Santa Cruz studying the quantum theory of magnetic phase transitions. Under contract with Cambridge University Press. 15(6): 1–13. Is faith irrational? This book is devoted to applied ethics. Then, I argue for dualism. Along similar lines, permissivism dispels common worries for pragmatic and moral encroachment. 55(2): 153–168. I came across this wonderful post by Liz Jackson, a Notre Dame PhD candidate in philosophy. Philosophy Compass. ), How Low Can You Go? 101. In this paper, I argue for Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism (IaBP): that there are evidential situations in which a single agent can rationally adopt more than one belief-attitude toward a proposition. 12 Tips for Success in Philosophy Graduate School, Official Version (Rowman and Littlefield), I was interviewed about this paper on Brain in a Vat (, I made a 6-minute video abstract of this paper (, Download the teaching and learning guide for this article (. There are a limited amount available, so I recommend registering ASAP before they’re all gone. For example, one’s believing one will survive a life-threating illness can make it more likely that they will survive (see James 1986). Forthcoming in Synthese. 107. (6) Faith, Hope, and Justification. Is Faith Irrational? Finally, I explore implications of dualism, both for the nature of evidence and how faith might go beyond the evidence but nonetheless be epistemically rational. Questions about what we should believe are central to philosophy. The latter outlines three categories of contemporary epistemology: traditional epistemology, social epistemology, and formal epistemology, along with corresponding theological questions that arise in each. Capturing Christianity 19,380 views. In The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology (John Greco, Tyler McNabb, and Jonathan Fuqua, eds.). First, I argue that if permissivism is true, then permissivism is likely true about theistic belief. what are the bounds of epistemic rationality? (1) Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction (with Tyron Goldschmidt, Rebecca Chan, and Dustin Crummett). Synthese. Can practical and/or moral stakes affect epistemic justification? I apply this work in epistemology to philosophy of religion, specifically to the epistemic and practical rationality of faith and religious commitment. On this view, belief and credence are independent, equally fundamental attitudes, and neither reduces to the other. Required fields are marked *. 100. New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury. 2,831 talking about this. Kyle Alander and Carl: TMM Responded to my 36 Questions for Atheists. 2020-11-27 47. Forthcoming in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Making progress on the relationship between belief and credence is one way to bring together the two branches of epistemology and see their relationship more clearly. (7) The Relationship Between Belief and Credence. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed. New; The New Theists (Joshua Rasmussen and Kevin Vallier, eds. (8) Faith and Reason. ), pp. (2021). Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness provides an argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, for if God existed he would not allow non-resistant non-belief to occur, but non-resistant non-belief does occur, so God does not exist. CCv1 The Capturing Christianity ‘Btw, God Exists Conference’ is an interactive apologetics event happening in Houston, TX. Then, I defend dualism, arguing that it can explain features of our mental lives that a credence-first view and a belief-first view cannot. I conclude that dualism is a promising view, and one that both epistemologists and philosophers of mind should take seriously. It touches on topics such as epistemic rationality, evidence, belief, desire, and more. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. While we do not claim to answer every possible objection to the wager, we conclude that many traditional objections are unsuccessful. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. Oliveira and Paul Silva, eds.). First, I specify conditions for someone’s being a resistant non-believer. This entry covers epistemology in two parts: one historical, one contemporary. (2018). In its most basic form, the argument points out that there is much to gain by believing in God if God exists; there is little to lose if God does not exist; thus, one should believe in, or ‘wager’ on, God. 2020-11-27 48. I do so first by painting a picture of the mind on which belief and credence are two cognitive tools that we use for different purposes. I have further interest in in the relationship between practical and epistemic rationality, e.g. Watch Queue Queue ), pp. Adherent Apologetics. On a credence-first view, credences are more fundamental and beliefs are a species of credence, e.g. The papers in this issue show that this progress is possible—there is more to be said about abortion and other crucial beginning-of-life issues. Youth Apologetics Empire: Answering the Non-Alchemist's 10 Questions for Christians. First, I argue that many who take Pascal’s wager have genuine faith that God exists. Then, I argue that many people fulfil these conditions because, given some plausible assumptions, there is a very good pragmatic reason to be a theist rather than an atheist. I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. Dr. Jackson's website:http://liz-jackson.com/ I begin by discussing self-justifying beliefs: beliefs that, when adopted, create evidence for the proposition believed. If one finds herself in a permissive case, then it is both possible and epistemically rational to believe for a practical reason. ), Faith, Belief, and Religious Experience, for an edited volume on religious experience (Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, ed. Kyle Alander and Carl: TMM Responded to my 36 Questions for Atheists. Second, on my picture, when we have faith in others, it is crucial to communicate this to them; but this is pre-theoretically plausible and also explains the importance of faith communities. Should you believe there’s a God? I conclude that the human mind is, in some ways, complex, but we should be happy with this conclusion also long as each mental state we posit has a clear role to play. 77–78. A paper defending belief-credence dualism (with Peter Tan), A paper on epistemology and Pascal’s wager, A paper defending an alternative version of Pascal’s wager, Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager, for a special issue of The Monist on faith, hope, and trust (Finlay Malcolm, ed. 2020-12-07 51. Dr. Jackson is at the forefront of the discussion in academia and we are bringing this topic to all of you. (12) Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment (with Jamie Fritz). Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. I argue that intrapersonal and interpersonal faith are sometimes similarly self-fulfilling: having faith in oneself or in others raises the probability that the target proposition obtains. Epistemology. I conclude that IaBP is a view that philosophers should take seriously. (Common in Christian apologetics.) In this paper, I argue that dualism can offer a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. 21(1): 59–84. If you’re interested, feel free to email me for a draft! The third shows how the social model of disability and the concept of transformative experience applies to classic debates like abortion and euthanasia. Holly Ordway: How Your Imagination Impacts Apologetics. Link to PDF here. Apologetics, General Thinking, Religion I came across this wonderful post by Liz Jackson, a Notre Dame PhD candidate in philosophy. I’m a professional photographer doing Christian apologetics, exposing the intellectual side of Christian belief. The power of the wager comes from the fact that it renders irrelevant all arguments for any worldview with a finite afterlife (including those with no afterlife). A core debate involves the relationship between belief and evidence. 2020-11-27 46. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational. Facebook gives people the power to share … (2021). This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? I argue that this makes better sense of the difference between rational credence and rational belief than other accounts. We argue that both objections are formal, but not substantive, problems for the wager, and that they both fail for the same reason. 2020-12-03 41. Drew (Genetically Modified Skeptic) offered his "4 Weird Questions That Might Make You an Atheist" we've heard him out and thought it through and want to explain how these 4 questions shouldn't make you an atheist.
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